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Enactivist Theories

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Philosophy of Social Cognition

Part of the book series: Palgrave Philosophy Today ((PPT))

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Abstract

For a long time, the theory-theory, modularity-theory and simulation-theory have dominated the debate on social cognition.. In this chapter, we look at new conceptions of cognition and alternative suggestions about how we understand other people’s mindsunder the heading of “enactivism”. Shaun Gallagher (2005), Thomas Fuchs (2018), Hanne de Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007) and others appeal to traditional phenomenological accounts of empathy to criticize central theoretical assumptions of representational accounts and argue for the primacy of interaction to observation and of perception to more sophisticated cognitive strategies to understand others. We scrutinize their arguments for the constitutive role of interaction for understanding and for the directness of perception and evaluate their claim that an inactive account can replace existing theory- and simulation-theories.

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  1. Philosophy, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

    Tobias Schlicht

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  1. Tobias Schlicht
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Schlicht, T. (2023). Enactivist Theories. In: Philosophy of Social Cognition. Palgrave Philosophy Today. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14491-2_6

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