Abstract
A negotiating team is a group of two or more agents who join together as a single negotiating party because they share a common goal related to the negotiation. Since a negotiating team is composed of several stakeholders, represented as a single negotiating party, there is need for a voting rule for the team to reach decisions. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of negotiating teams. Specifically, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a manipulation for a single voter when using a positional scoring rule. We show that the problem is still tractable when there is a coalition of manipulators that uses a x-approval rule. The coalitional manipulation problem becomes computationally hard when using Borda, but we provide a polynomial-time algorithm with the following guarantee: given a manipulable instance with k manipulators, the algorithm finds a successful manipulation with at most one additional manipulator. Our results hold for both constructive and destructive manipulations.
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Notes
- 1.
Our definition of a candidate’s position in a voter’s ranking is the opposite of the commonly used, and we chose it to enhance the readability of the proofs: \({pos(o,p_i)} \ge {pos(o',p_j)}\) is naturally translated to “o is ranked in \(p_i\) higher than \(o'\) is ranked in \(p_j\)”.
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This research was supported in part by the Ministry of Science, Technology & Space, Israel.
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Schmerler, L., Hazon, N. (2021). Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams. In: Fotakis, D., Ríos Insua, D. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13023. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_14
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