Abstract
In this chapter we will develop a way for moral realism to respond to evolutionary debunking arguments. In general terms, debunking arguments that appeal to evolutionary theory hold that natural selection and moral realism are incompatible. Our aims are threefold. First, we will describe some of the relevant arguments in the debate on this topic. We distinguish between a modal argument, a parsimony argument, and Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma. Second, we will focus on Street’s argument, which has ignited most of the recent interdisciplinary debate between philosophy of biology and metaethics. We will focus on the overlooked fundamental tenets of moral realism to open a route for defending it: its cognitivist character, its representational language nature, and the relationship between evaluative judgments and their truthmakers (which are facts). This will allow us to propose a response to the evolutionary debunking arguments. Finally, contra Street, we will argue that moral realism is not scientifically inferior to moral anti-realism and, therefore, the former is not debunked.
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Notes
- 1.
We want to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these cases.
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Acknowledgments
We are grateful to our anonymous referees for their valuable comments on the manuscript. Thanks also to the audiences at the ISHPSSB São Paulo meeting (July 2017), the Seminario de Investigadores at Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - UNAM (February 2018), and the AIFIBI meeting in Bogotá (July 2018) for useful discussions. AM wishes to thank to the Beca CONACyT para Estancias Posdoctorales Nacionales for financial support.
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Martínez, M., Mosqueda, A., Oseguera, J. (2020). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Moral Realism. In: Baravalle, L., Zaterka, L. (eds) Life and Evolution. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol 26. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39589-6_7
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