Abstract

This book evaluates the risks that China’s intellectual property (IP) regime poses to innovation. The regime has been heavily criticized in recent years as potentially stifling innovation. In fact, disputes over China’s allegedly inadequate IP regime and IP “theft” have contributed to one of the biggest trade wars in modern history. However, at the same time, China’s innovation capabilities have risen significantly and major reforms have recently been made to the country’s IP regime. How risky, really, is China’s IP regime for innovation? This book evaluates this important and timely question based on a multidisciplinary analysis involving law, management, economics, and political science.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hereafter “IP” and “IPR” are used interchangeably.

  2. 2.

    Invention patents in China can be granted to both products and processes, and must meet a standard for absolute novelty, inventiveness, and practical use as determined by a Substantive Examination. Their duration of protection is 20 years.

  3. 3.

    Utility models in China can be granted on the shape and/or structure of a product, and do not undergo a Substantive Examination but are required to be novel, meet a lower level of inventiveness than invention patents, and must meet criteria for practical use. Their duration of protection is 10 years.

  4. 4.

    Registered designs/design patents in China are granted on the aesthetic aspects of an item used in commerce. They do not undergo a Substantive Examination nor have to meet any inventive step/technical function thresholds; however, they must be distinct from prior designs, and should not conflict with prior rights like copyrights or trademarks. Their current duration of protection is 10 years (although it has recently been proposed, in a draft revisions to the patent law, to protect them for 15 years).

  5. 5.

    Trade secrets in China protect valuable non-public information guarded with confidentiality measures. They remain protected indefinitely as long as they meet their corresponding legal requirements.

  6. 6.

    Trademarks in China are granted on identifying and distinguishing signs or symbols in goods and services. Their duration of protection is 10 years, which is extendable indefinitely upon renewal every 10 years.

  7. 7.

    Copyrights in China are granted on original authored or otherwise created creative work. The duration of protection of the copyright depends on the type of creative work at hand, for example an authored work is protected for the lifetime of the author plus 50 years after his/her death.

  8. 8.

    Plant variety rights/protection (PVP) in China refers to improved plant varieties developed by breeders that possess novelty, distinctness, uniformity and stability, as well as an appropriate denomination. The duration of PVP in China is 15 years for most crops and 20 years for trees and vines.

  9. 9.

    Geographical indications (GIs) in China are granted on signs on goods with a specific geographical origin and qualities or reputation mainly derived from natural or cultural factors from that origin. As with trademarks, GIs duration of protection is 10 years, which is extendable indefinitely upon renewal every 10 years.

  10. 10.

    Integrated circuits in China are granted on the layout-design/typography of semi-conductors. Their duration of protection is 10 years.

  11. 11.

    Also, in high-income countries there remains room for debate about how exactly to design an IP regime that optimally encourages technological development and economic growth (e.g., see Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998; Jaffe and Lerner 2004; Encaoua et al. 2006).

  12. 12.

    World Bank (2001, p. 141–142), provides a typology of different IP policies that are both consistent with the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) Agreement and are recommended for countries in the low-income vs. middle-income vs. high-income stages of development.

  13. 13.

    See http://data.worldbank.org/country.china.

  14. 14.

    The S&T MLP set-forth the goals for China to become an “innovation-oriented” country by 2020 and a “leading science power” by 2050, as well as to reduce China’s dependence on technology from other countries to 30 percent or less.

  15. 15.

    Full text (in Chinese) of opinions available at http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-11/27/content_5138533.htm.

  16. 16.

    For example, these shortcomings include high subjectivity in survey questions, potential sampling bias, selection bias in terms of the type of staff responding within the firms to the survey, etc. Also, given differences in sampling size and method from year-to-year there is some difficulty comparing these survey results over time.

  17. 17.

    For example, 81% of US firms surveyed by the American Chamber of Commerce in China (AmCham) considered IP protection in China in 2004 to be “ineffective” or “totally ineffective” (AmCham 2006, p 28).

  18. 18.

    Data in the report regards decisions made by three key IP Courts and their precedential courts and 12 other intermediate courts (IC) from Jan 1, 2011 to Dec. 31, 2015. In total, 5983 decisions have been analyzed. Among this sample, 644 decisions were made by three IP Courts, 2910 were made by the precedential courts of the three IP Courts, and 2429 were made by 12 other intermediate courts. However, only 1521 decisions have the exact acceptance date (EAD) and can be used to analyze the time for processing patent infringement disputes.

  19. 19.

    In this period, Changsha Intermediate People’s Court accepted 3309 cases and completed 431 patent cases, 1210 trademark cases, 846 copyright cases, and 17 unfair competition cases.

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Prud’homme, D., Zhang, T. (2019). Introduction. In: China’s Intellectual Property Regime for Innovation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10404-7_1

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