Abstract
This article describes the rationale for formal methods and considers the benefits, weaknesses, and difficulties in applying these methods to digital systems used in critical applications. It suggests factors for consideration when formal methods are offered in support of certification in a context such as DO-178B (the guidelines for software used on board civil aircraft) [40]. The presentation is intended for those to whom these topics are new. A more technical discussion of formal methods is available as a technical report [42].
This work was sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Technical Center, Atlantic City NJ, and by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Langley Research Center, Langley VA, under Contract NAS1-18969.
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Rushby, J. (1997). Formal Methods and their Role in the Certification of Critical Systems. In: Shaw, R. (eds) Safety and Reliability of Software Based Systems. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0921-1_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0921-1_1
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