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International Telecommunications, Settlement Rates, and the FCC

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Abstract

This paper models settlement arrangements between international telecommunication carriers. The FCC in the United States claims these arrangements cost United States consumers billions of dollars annually, largely to subsidize foreign carriers in low-income countries. A model is given which makes sense of this claim, as well as the role of costs, competition, and income disparities in settlement rate determination. Findings are tested using data spanning 17 years and 167 countries. Some implications are drawn for the FCC's recently proposed settlement rate caps, as well as for proposals for multilateral solutions.

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Wright, J. International Telecommunications, Settlement Rates, and the FCC. Journal of Regulatory Economics 15, 267–292 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008082314342

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008082314342

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