Abstract
Although anxiety is frequently seen as a predominantly negative phenomenon, some recent researchers have argued that it plays an important positive function, serving as an alert to warn agents of possible problems or threats. I argue that not only can one’s own, first-personal anxiety perform this function; because it is possible for others—in particular, one’s friends—to feel anxious on one’s behalf, their anxious feelings can sometimes play the same role in our functioning, and make similar contributions to our well-being. I distinguish between a number of kinds of cases in which what I call proxy anxiety serves a positive function, including Anxiety Avoidance (where there is good reason for an agent to avoid becoming anxious herself, but can benefit from a friend’s anxiety on her behalf), Anxiety Omission (where an agent fails to become anxious due to a malfunctioning anxiety-generating system), long-term commitments involving dispositions to feel other-directed proxy anxiety, and cases in which proxy anxiety can help reduce or relieve excessive anxiety. A person’s friends, it is argued, are particularly well positioned to help regulate deficient and/or excessive anxieties, precisely because friends are close enough to care for and identify with the agent, but at the same time distant enough to maintain a relatively objective perspective. I conclude by examining connections between proxy anxiety and theories of well-being.
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Notes
Of course, we might worry that there is something unacceptably paternalistic about Knightley’s attitude toward Emma’s moral improvement. I am using the case simply as an example of anxious concern for another—and not, for instance, as an exegesis of Emma; so I can simply assume, or stipulate, that Knightley’s intentions, etc., are admirable. (Both Emma and Austen clearly judge them to be so.) Faced with a real-world example, however, we would require far more detailed information before being in a position to judge the mentor’s conduct and attitudes to be laudable.
I owe thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for hel** me see things in these terms.
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This article belongs to the topical collection “Worry and Wellbeing: Understanding the Nature,Value, and Challenges of Anxiety”, edited by Charlie Kurth and Juliette Vazard.
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Jollimore, T. Anxious feelings, anxious friends: on anxiety and friendship. Synthese 199, 14709–14724 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03440-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03440-w