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Boolean Paradoxes and Revision Periods

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Abstract

According to the revision theory of truth, the paradoxical sentences have certain revision periods in their valuations with respect to the stages of revision sequences. We find that the revision periods play a key role in characterizing the degrees of paradoxicality for Boolean paradoxes. We prove that a Boolean paradox is paradoxical in a digraph, iff this digraph contains a closed walk whose height is not any revision period of this paradox. And for any finitely many (but non-zero) numbers greater than 1, if any of them is not divisible by any other, we can construct a Boolean paradox whose primary revision periods are just these numbers. Consequently, the degrees of Boolean paradoxes form an unbounded dense lattice. The area of Boolean paradoxes is proved to be rich in mathematical structures and properties.

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  1. School of Politics and Administration, South China Normal University, Guangzhou, 510631, People’s Republic of China

    Ming Hsiung

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  1. Ming Hsiung
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Correspondence to Ming Hsiung.

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Hsiung, M. Boolean Paradoxes and Revision Periods. Stud Logica 105, 881–914 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-017-9715-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-017-9715-2

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