Abstract
The international network of submarine cables plays a crucial role in facilitating global telecommunications connectivity, carrying over 99% of all internet traffic. However, submarine cables challenge digital sovereignty due to their ownership structure, cross-jurisdictional nature, and vulnerabilities to malicious actors. In this article, we assess these challenges, current policy initiatives designed to mitigate them, and the limitations of these initiatives. The nature of submarine cables curtails a state’s ability to regulate the infrastructure on which it relies, reduces its data security, and threatens its ability to provide telecommunication services. States currently address these challenges through regulatory controls over submarine cables and associated companies, investing in the development of additional cable infrastructure, and implementing physical protection measures for the cables themselves. Despite these efforts, the effectiveness of current mechanisms is hindered by significant obstacles arising from technical limitations and a lack of international coordination on regulation. We conclude by noting how these obstacles lead to gaps in states’ policies and point towards how they could be improved to create a proactive approach to submarine cable governance that defends states’ digital sovereignty.
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Notes
While Art. 52 of the Geneva Convention states “In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”, Art. 52.3 of the Geneva Convention states that "In case of doubt concerning an object that is normally used for civilian purposes—such as a house or other dwelling, a place of worship, or a school—parties to a conflict must assume that the object in question is not being used for military purposes". In general, several conditions must be satisfied for dual-use objects to be considered legitimate targets: purpose, effectiveness, definite military advantage, distinction, and proportionality. Moreover, if undersea cables connect non-belligerent countries, they may be considered immune under the Tallinn Manual (and Oslo Manual). Against this background, there is no clear-cut answer, and the subject is open to judicial interpretation.
The owners of one Red Sea cable have not been made public.
Currently, there exists the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization. However, this governs only Intelsat and does not include projects such as Starlink.
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Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Tyler Schroder for his contributions to this paper. Martina Camellini’s and Claudio Novelli’s contributions were supported by funding provided by the Vodafone Institute to the University of Bologna.
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Ganz, A., Camellini, M., Hine, E. et al. Submarine Cables and the Risks to Digital Sovereignty. Minds & Machines 34, 31 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-024-09683-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-024-09683-z