Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Lewis fails to undermine thatP-theory by means of a variation of Kripke'sPuzzle. The flaw in Lewis's argument, given a wide interpretation ofworld-fitness, is that it simply begs the question against theP-theorist. I then argued that, given the narrow interpretation ofworld-fitness, Lewis's argument fails because Pierre doesn't have a belief that is narrowly characterizable by a sentence like,
Pierre believes that the city that he identifies asLondon is pretty in either Kripke's story or even in Lewis's own variation of Kripke's story. It now remains to be seen whether theP-theory can be directly refuted by other arguments.
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Elugardo, R. Lewis's puzzle about singular belief-attribution. Philosophia 17, 461–476 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02381065
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02381065